Introduction
[2] GICs have proven to be a threat to power networks at high latitudes [Boteler et al., 1998; Lam et al., 2002; Kappenman, 2005; Pirjola, 2005; Beland and Small, 2004; Pulkkinen et al., 2005; Wik et al., 2009] . In order to transport large amounts of power over greater distances the trend has been to build long transmission lines which are then exposed to larger induced voltages driving larger GICs [Molinski, 2002] . This trend makes power networks increasingly more susceptible to GIC activity [Pulkkinen et al., 2005] with GIC levels in Canada and the United States 2-3 times higher than those occurring 20 years ago [Molinski, 2002] . Consequently, the impacts of GICs on power networks at lower latitudes are increasingly being considered [Gaunt and Coetzee, 2007; Trivedi et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2009a Liu et al., , 2009b Ngwira et al., 2009; Watari et al., 2009; Shiga, 2010] . For example, Watari et al. [2009] conducted a two year study of GIC measurements in Hokkaido, Japan and found that GICs associated with substorms can be detected in Japan even at the solar minimum although intense GICs occurred mostly during geomagnetic storms. In addition, some authors have suggested that some power network faults may also be attributed to the premature aging of components due to accumulated exposure to GIC activity levels previously considered benign [Molinski, 2002; Beland and Small, 2004; Shiga, 2010] .
[3] Historically, Australian latitudes (∼9-44°S GG) have been considered at low risk to GIC activity with space weather typically overlooked when exploring causes for network faults. Recently, the eastern Australian state power grids have been interconnected (Figure 1 ). The network now spans some thousands of kilometers and therefore has an increased susceptibility to GICs. This paper describes an analysis of space weather related GIC activity and whether this is potentially hazardous to power networks at Australian latitudes.
[4] As GICs in conductors are driven by the "geoelectric"
field associated with variations of the geomagnetic field [Viljanen and Pirjola, 1994; Viljanen, 1997; Pirjola, 2000 Pirjola, , 2002 Pirjola, , 2005 many GIC studies use geomagnetic data and/or activity indices to infer space weather conditions that enhance GIC activity in power networks. Viljanen [1997] presented a study on the time rate of magnetic field change, dB/dt, and geomagnetic field variation amplitude, DB, from 157 active days of IMAGE magnetometer data at auroral latitudes concluding that field-aligned currents also contribute to GICs in addition to the auroral electrojets. Wik et al. [2009] discussed the July 1982 and the 2003 Halloween storms in terms of geomagnetic field maximum excursions, DB max , as well as dB/dt values. Boteler et al. [1998] presented the results of a statistical study of hourly range and dB/dt values derived from geomagnetic field data measured in the geographic north-south direction. Pulkkinen et al. [2005] and Liu et al. [2009a] used dH/dt as an indicator of GIC intensities, where H is the geomagnetic field measured in the geomagnetic north-south direction. Pulkkinen et al. [2008] investigated the statistics of geoelectric field values at high latitudes derived from geomagnetic field data to estimate the probability of extreme geoelectric fields and GIC magnitudes.
[5] A recent study by Marshall et al. [2010] showed that a "GIC index" derived from geomagnetic field data is a better indicator of GIC activity than dB/dt. Analogous to dB/dt data, the proposed GIC index uses only geomagnetic field data and can be applied to any location irrespective of ground conductivity or ionospheric current system geometry. In Section 2 of this paper the GIC index is applied to reports of enhanced GIC activity in power networks from around the world observed over the past few decades to define a probability based threat level model. Section 3 applies the results of this model to geomagnetic field data from the Australian region recorded over the previous two solar cycles. Section 4 discusses the implications of the occurrence of GIC activity potentially hazardous to the Australian power network.
Historical Analysis

Observed GIC Activity Versus a GIC Index
[6] A literature search was conducted to obtain documented occurrences of GIC activity observed in power networks over the past several decades [Barnes et al., 1991; Elovaara et al., 1992; Dickmander et al., 1994; Viljanen and Pirjola, 1994; Bozoki et al., 1996; Araki et al., 1997; Trivedi et al., 1997 Trivedi et al., , 2007 Viljanen, 1997; Boteler et al., 1998; Boteler and Jansen van Beek, 1999; Kappenman et al., 2000; Kappenman, 2003 Kappenman, , 2005 Pirjola, 2000; Thomson et al., 2001; Erinmez et al., 2002; Beamish et al., 2002; Bolduc, 2002; Lam et al., 2002; Koen and Gaunt, 2003; Beland and Small, 2004; Pulkkinen et al., 2005; Gaunt and Coetzee, 2007; Liu et al., 2009a; Ngwira et al., 2009; Watari et al., 2009; Wik et al., 2009] . Only occurrences that reported GIC activity with time stamps accurate to the nearest minute with corresponding location coordinates were selected for further analysis, providing a direct link between the geophysical phenomena and the technological impacts [Pulkkinen et al., 2005] . There are no clear rules for defining hazardous GIC activity due to the influence of network hardware, geometry, loading, ground conductivity and ionospheric current geometry. The magnitudes of GICs in transformers considered hazardous are highly dependent on the particular power system and vary greatly from system to system and site to site [Pirjola, 2005] . In this study documented events of GIC activity were categorized as "fault" (value = 1) or "no fault" (value = 0). A "fault" condition was defined here as a reported occurrence of increased GIC activity measured or observed in a power network that resulted in the "tripping" of, or damage to, some component of the power network such as a line trip, Static Var Compensator (SVC) trip, filters tripped, transformer fault, damage to transformer insulation material, or surge arrestor damaged. A "no fault" condition was defined as a reported occurrence of increased GIC activity measured or observed in a power network that did not result in a trip, e.g., increased current in transformer neutrals, transformer noise, alarms, increased harmonics observed.
[7] Magnetometer data from observatories located near the observed increase in network GIC activity were processed to derive associated GIC indices utilizing the following frequency domain filter defined by Marshall et al. [2010] :
where f is frequency and f N is the Nyquist frequency. The GIC indices obtained using equation (1) represent a proxy for the horizontal components of the geoelectric field (assuming a horizontal plane wavefield incident on a uniform conducting Earth). Typically, a complete day of 1 min sampled single component (e.g., x component) geomagnetic field variometer data was processed using equation (1) to produce the corresponding GIC indices for each day according to the following. Let x(t) and y(t) Figure 1 . 
where FFT{} −1 represents the inverse Fourier Transform of the quantity inside the parentheses, Z( f ) is the filter function of equation (1), and | | denotes the absolute value of the complex quantity returned by the inverse transform. A Hamming window was applied to the time series data prior to transformation into the frequency domain and the p/4 phase shift in equation (1) was applied to positive frequency values and the complex conjugate of negative frequency values. Analogous relationships for geomagnetic field data recorded in the geomagnetic north-south NS and EW directions can be obtained using geomagnetic h and d component data in equations (2a) and (2b), respectively. All GIC indices used for further analyses were compared against the original geomagnetic data time series as a form of quality control checking for possible spectral contamination resulting from data gaps, spikes, saturation or other such spurious events in the time series data.
[8] The maximum GIC index was obtained from all geomagnetic observatory data readily available within a defined distance radius and time window of the associated documented GIC activity location and epoch, respectively. The search radius was based on maximum scale sizes of 600 km reported by Ngwira et al. [2009] . The search radius used in this study was 585 km and the maximum time search window was ±5 min. The time search window interval was considered a reasonable estimate to allow for possible inaccuracies in documented times and/or geomagnetic field data time stamps. Events with locations and/or times exceeding these windows were discarded.
[9] A typical example of GIC index data and the associated documented faults are shown in Figure 2 . This plot shows geomagnetic field x and y component data from the Ottawa observatory Canada (45.40°N 284.45°E), and derived GIC indices for the geomagnetic storm of 13 March 1989. The impacts of this storm on power networks have been well documented in the literature [Barnes et al., 1991; Bolduc, 2002] . The times of transformer failure/ network separation and line trip after power resumed is indicated by the vertical dashed markers in Figure 2 at 0744 UT and 2151 UT, respectively. Several faults occurred simultaneously at 0744 UT within a 600 km radius of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory. The fault that occurred at 2151 UT was located at 44.92°N, −74.1°W (GG) approximately 125 km from the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory. Figure 2 shows that the faults coincide with large GIC x and/or GIC y indices. Additional large GIC indices occurred during the 9 h interval following the first fault when the network was offline. Figure 2 also suggests that in this situation the large GIC indices appear to be associated with typical substorm signatures in the geomagnetic field, often the case at high latitudes [Boteler et al., 1998; Pulkkinen et al., , 2005 .
[10] Figure 3 Table 1 also gives the abbreviation of nearby geomagnetic observatories, the geometric distance from the observatory to the fault location, the maximum GIC y and GIC x indices derived from geomagnetic field x and y component data, respectively, and the time window, Dt, to the maximum GIC index. A brief description of the documented GIC activity is also provided with appropriate reference(s). Table 1 is in ascending order of GIC y index. Fully deterministic investigations of GIC related network faults require knowledge of many factors such as magnetospheric and ionospheric source current geometry [Pirjola, 2002] , earth conductivity models [Ngwira et al., 2009] , network orientation, length, transformer type [Pirjola, 2005] , relay settings [Pulkkinen et al., 2005] , and load [Molinski, 2002] , some of which may be difficult to determine accurately. Alternatively, the GIC indices of Table 1 may be related to network faults utilizing a statistical approach, providing a probabilistic description of the threat to power networks using a simple space weather activity indicator. [12] This section describes the method used for quantifying a probabilistic description of the threat to power systems as a function of observed GIC index. Figures 4a  and 4b show the fault value of 0 or 1 (or fault occurrence) from Table 1 plotted against GIC index for GIC y index and GIC x index, respectively. The plots suggest that more faults occur in association with larger GIC indices, showing a rough trend of higher GIC indices being more likely to occur with a fault than lower indices, as might be expected. The plots also suggest that "fault occurrence" is associated with lower GIC x index than GIC y index. Beamish et al. [2002] noted that the hourly standard deviations of geomagnetic field data obtained from observatories in the UK were generally greater in the X component than in the Y component. Elovaara et al. [1992] noted that statistically the geoelectric field has its maximum in the geomagnetic eastwest direction. It is therefore expected that maximum GIC x indices obtained at the time of "fault occurrence" would be smaller than those obtained for GIC y indices. The GIC x and GIC y indices represent indicators of space weather activity hazardous to power networks.
Threat Level Modeling
[13] Figure 5 shows the GIC index and fault data binned by equal number of GIC index values with the vertical axis showing the fraction of data points in each bin containing a fault. The roughly monotonic relationship of the binned data shown in Figure 5 suggests a simple model for the power system threat probability, g(, GIC), where describes one or more parameters of the model and 0 ≤ g ≤ 1.
[14] Applying Bayes' theorem, assuming a uniform prior for the we obtain
where D represents the data available with D i = {GIC i , R i } with R i being either a 0 or 1 depending on whether a fault has occurred. The D i defined above explicitly conditions the probability estimate on the GIC index only. If other factors such as source current geometry, earth conductivity, network orientation, length and other infrastructure details were sufficiently well known, the complexity of the model g(, GIC, .....) could be increased accordingly.
[15] The use of equation (3) as a measure of the threat to a specific power network therefore makes the following assumptions.
[16] 1. The different power networks in the data set constitute a uniform population. [17] 2. The total population of D i = {GIC i , R i }, is a subsample selected independently of R, i.e., the data selection is unbiased such that P("fault") + P("no fault") = 1.
[18] 3. The specific power network is similar in design to the networks in the input data, including external factors such as ground conductivity.
[19] These assumptions are approximately true for the data set presented in this study. It is most likely that some of the data rely on reports from personnel operating power infrastructure. Examination of Table 1 shows that the events listed with a 0 for 'no fault' are associated with abnormal behavior within the power system that did not cause a mechanical response. A potential issue is that for a given GIC index, 'no fault' events may not have been reported as they are less interesting compared with "fault" Table 1 . Table 1 also gives the abbreviation of nearby geomagnetic observatories (Stn), the geometric distance from the observatory to the fault location (Dist), the maximum GIC y and GIC x indices derived from geomagnetic field x and y component data, respectively, and the time window, Dt y and Dt x , to the maximum GIC y index and GIC x index, respectively.
A brief description of the documented GIC activity is also provided with appropriate reference(s). or readily observable abnormal system behavior. If we define these events as "no interesting fault" with a value of say −1 then the probability of a fault can be expressed by
If the last term of equation (4) is neglected then the sample of events is a biased sample and equation (3) will hold only approximately and probabilistic inferences drawn from the data have subsequent limitations. The probability P in this study is therefore considered a relative measure. Given the above limitations, equation (3) becomes
where
Examination of several simple functional forms reveal that a logarithmic model for g(, GIC) given by
is most suitable. Note that g(, GIC) is limited to values between 0 and 1 by defining the minimum and maximum fault probabilities, respectively, as
The model with maximum likelihood is shown as the red lines in Figure 5 for both the GIC y index and the GIC x index data, respectively. The blue lines show the region enclosing 95% of the probability. The normal distribution was found to be a good approximation for most GIC levels, and hence the blue lines of Figure 5 represent the 2-sigma uncertainty.
[20] For Figure 5 (top) the 0 and 1 parameters of equation (7) with maximum likelihood were calculated to be 0 = −1.158 and 1 = 0.759, giving minimal fault probability for GIC y ≤ 34 and maximum fault probability for GIC y ≥ 698, respectively. For Figure 5 (bottom) the 0 and 1 parameters of equation (7) with maximum likelihood were calculated to be 0 = −0.890 and 1 = 0.753, giving minimal fault probability for GIC x ≤ 15 and maximum fault probability for GIC x ≥ 323, respectively. The 2s uncertainty range corresponding to the blue lines of Figure 5 (top) is shown in Figure 6 (top) and varies up to approximately 15% which limits the banding of probability ranges for assigning threat level terminology. A ±2s banding level corresponding to 30% is therefore considered reasonable for defining fault probability thresholds. Risk levels of <5%, 5-35%, 35-65%, 65-95% and >95% were assigned threat levels of "very low," "low," "moderate," "high" and "extreme." Evaluation of equation (7) gives associated GIC y index thresholds of GIC y ≤ 39, 40 < GIC y ≤ 97, 98 < GIC y ≤ 241, 242 < GIC y ≤ 600 and GIC y > 600, respectively. These thresholds may be rounded to the nearest 50 index units for ease of implementation to give GIC y ≤ 50, 50 < GIC y ≤ 100, 100 < GIC y ≤ 250, 250 < GIC y ≤ 600 and GIC y > 600, respectively. Using Figure 5 (bottom) and Figure 6 (bottom) analogous GIC x index thresholds are determined to be GIC x ≤ 16, 17 < GIC x ≤ 43, 44 < GIC x ≤ 114, 115 < GIC x ≤ 304 and GIC x > 305. These thresholds are approximately half of those obtained Figure 5 . Binned (top) GIC y index and (bottom) GIC x index plotted against fault occurrence "probability" as defined in the text. The red lines in both plots are the respective maximum likelihood probability models and the blue lines indicate the 2s range.
using GIC y indices. The threat levels of "low," "moderate," "high" and "extreme" may be applied to GIC y indices using lower limit threshold values of 50, 100, 250, and 600, respectively, or half these threshold values for GIC x indices.
[21] The above analysis excluded events from Table 1 for GIC activity observed in Finland. Although very large GICs have been observed in the Finnish power network, Finland's transformers have not suffered noticeable GIC problems [Pirjola, 2005] . This has been attributed to the transformer type, structure and the use of blocking devices in transformer neutrals. The Finnish network is considered unique in the world [Pirjola, 2005] and has therefore been excluded from the above analysis. Including the Finland data of Table 1 in the analysis results in larger GIC indices and uncertainties than those presented above.
[22] Many authors have used dB x /dt alone as a proxy for the local behavior of the average level of dB/dt [Weigel et al., 2002, and references therein; Trichtchenko and Boteler, 2004; Viljanen et al., 2006] . Further, Figure 6 (bottom) shows the 2s uncertainty is slightly lower for GIC y indices compared with GIC x indices derived from y component data. This study utilizes the thresholds determined using GIC y indices to further analyze the susceptibility of the Australian power network to space weather GIC activity. GIC related faults in networks depend on many factors such as magnetospheric and ionospheric source current geometry [Pirjola, 2002] , earth conductivity models [Ngwira et al., 2009] , network orientation, length, transformer type [Pirjola, 2005] , relay settings [Pulkkinen et al., 2005] , and load [Molinski, 2002] and it is therefore expected that any relationship between GIC index and "fault" occurrence would exhibit some variability, such as that exhibited in Figures 4-6.
Australian Region Analysis
[23] In applying the risk levels determined in section 2.2 to the Australian region, it is reasonable to assume that the power network is comparable to most of the power networks contributing to the data in Table 1 . Figure 7 shows GIC y indices (>50) calculated using geomagnetic field data from Australian stations shown in Figure 8 for the previous two solar cycles. The highest latitude station, Hobart Tasmania, only had data available for one solar cycle. The solar cycle sunspot number is shown as the pink line and the GIC indices derived from the different stations are indicated using different colored symbols. The lower limits for "low," "moderate" and "high" risk levels determined in section 2.2 for GIC y indices are indicated by the yellow, orange and red horizontal lines, respectively. The dark blue symbols are for GIC y indices derived from Hobart, Tasmania (∼50°S GM). All other GIC indices are derived from mainland Australia stations.
[24] Figure 7 indicates that GIC y indices derived from the mainland stations primarily only reached the "low" threat levels defined above during the past two solar cycles. Furthermore, of all the mainland stations used in this study only GIC y indices from Canberra reached "moderate" levels over the previous two solar cycles, this being on 2 occasions during the "superstorm" of 13 March 1989. The Canberra station was the highest latitude station of all mainland stations used in this study. No GIC y indices derived from the mainland stations used in this study reached "moderate" levels during solar cycle 23. GIC y indices derived from Hobart data reached the "moderate" threat levels defined here on 21 occasions over 9 different days during solar cycle 23. None of the Australian station GIC y indices during the previous two solar cycles reached the "high" or "extreme" threat levels defined in this study. It can also be seen from Figure 7 that significant GIC activity (as quantified in terms of the GIC Figure 6 . The variation of the 2s uncertainty level for the maximum likelihood models of (top) GIC y index and (bottom) GIC x index as a function of GIC index.
index) occurred during solar maximum and the solar cycle declining phase.
Space Weather Implications
[25] The purpose of this study was to provide a preliminary assessment of the risk of the Australian power network to space weather related GIC activity by investigating whether GIC activity potentially hazardous to power networks occurs at Australian latitudes. The analysis is based on a GIC index derived from geomagnetic field data and risk levels derived from a relative probability model determined from historical events of docu- Figure 7 . GIC y indices (>50) from Australian magnetometer locations of Figure 8 plotted with solar sunspot number (pink). The horizontal yellow, orange, and red lines are the lower limit thresholds for the "low," "moderate," and "high" threat levels defined in this study. mented GIC activity in power networks from around the world. The results of the analysis of historical events in section 2.2 suggests lower limit threshold GIC y indices of 50, 100, 250, and 600 corresponding to the risk levels of "low," "moderate," "high" and "extreme," respectively. These risk levels may be used as a guide for space weather activity hazardous to power networks analogous to those in Table 1 .
[26] One of the early reactions to the Quebec power network failure was the signing of an agreement with the Canadian Geological Survey to provide advanced warning of large geomagnetic storms to the power network operations center so that operators could take action to mitigate the impact [Bolduc, 2002] . Similarly, Transpower, New Zealand sought warnings of impending geomagnetic storm activity to help manage the amount of GIC activity in the power network following the SI event of 6 November 2001 [Beland and Small, 2004] . IPS Radio and Space Services, the Space Weather unit of the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, is working with the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) to assist with the "risk management" of space weather and implement appropriate warnings and alerts advising network operators to take action to reduce possible impacts from anticipated geomagnetic storms. The anticipated warnings and alerts are to incorporate the threat levels derived in this study.
[27] The results presented in Figure 7 suggest that only southern Australian regions reach the "moderate" risk levels defined in this study with mainland southern Australia stations reaching this risk level only twice over the previous two solar cycles. Tasmania reached moderate levels approximately 20 times during the previous solar cycle. Furthermore, moderate risk levels are typically only observed in Australia during solar maximum and the decline phase. This study suggests that possible precautionary actions such as load reduction and isolation of interregional networks should be considered for southern parts of the Australian power network during extreme space weather events of solar maximum and the decline phase. Isolated networks could be rejoined once space weather induced GIC activity has abated. This would appear particularly relevant for Tasmania which is at similar latitudes to Christchurch in New Zealand, the location of one of the network faults given in Table 1 . A High Voltage DC (HVDC) link connects Tasmania and the Australian mainland (Figure 1 ), analogous to the HVDC link between New Zealand's North and South islands. Beland and Small [2004] noted that up until the event of 6 November 2001 GICs had not been recorded on the New Zealand power system and no damage had been reported. In addition, the authors noted that one of the factors contributing to New Zealand previously being considered at low risk to space weather GICs was its midlatitude location. At the time of the November 2001 event alarms were received by the High-Voltage DC (HVDC) operator and it took some 15-20 min before personnel started to consider space weather GIC activity as a possible cause. This study suggests increased awareness by power network operators and possible precautionary actions (such as those listed in the work by Molinski [2002] ) for southern most Australia networks could avoid such delays in ascertaining the cause of GIC related faults and help mitigate their impact.
[28] Watari et al. [2009] suggested that only extreme events are likely to have a significant impact on the power network in Japan. The results of this study would similarly suggest that primarily large storms, e.g., "superstorms," that typically occur 1-2 times per solar cycle have the potential of causing significant damage to the mainland Australia power network. However, in recent years there has been increased connectivity between eastern Australia states ( Figure 1 ) which is expected to increase the risk to the network from GIC activity [Molinski, 2002] . In addition, some authors suggest that power network faults may also be attributed to the premature aging of components due to accumulated exposure to GIC activity levels previously considered benign [Molinski, 2002; Beland and Small, 2004; Shiga, 2010] . Wik et al. [2009] suggested that the geomagnetic storm of 13-14 July 1982 would have resulted in more serious consequences were it not for the favorable summer load situations, indicating network loading plays a role. More precise studies that consider ionospheric current geometry, Earth's conductivity, network loading, orientation, and infrastructure details should be conducted to provide a more accurate risk assessment. This study should be considered as a guide to space weather activity hazardous to power networks in Australia.
Conclusion
[29] This paper presents the results of a preliminary risk assessment of the Australian power network to space weather related GIC activity. Table 1 summarizes the results of a literature search of documented occurrences of GIC activity in power networks from around the world observed over the past few decades. Geomagnetic field data from magnetometer stations located nearby the documented occurrences were processed using a "GIC frequency domain filter" to produce an associated GIC index, providing a direct link between the geophysical phenomena and the technological impacts. An analysis of fault occurrence and GIC index was used to derive a relative probability model and associated risk levels to power networks from GIC activity. The analysis suggests lower limit threshold GIC y indices of 50, 100, 250, and 600 corresponding to the risk levels of "low," "moderate," "high" and "extreme," respectively. Analysis of GIC y indices derived from Australian magnetometer data shows only southern Australian regions reached the "moderate" risk levels defined in this study with mainland southern Australia stations reaching this risk level twice during the previous two solar cycles. More southern Australian regions such as Tasmania reached moderate levels approximately 20 times during the previous solar cycle. Moderate risk levels are typically only observed in Australia during solar maximum and the declining phase.
